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Abstract
We analyze how trading in secondary markets for public debt change the inherent links
between monetary and fiscal policy, by studying both inflation and debt dynamics. When
agents do not trade in these markets, there exists a unique steady state and traditional
passive/active policy prescriptions are useful in delivering determinate equilibria. In contrast,
when agents trade in secondary markets and bonds are scarce, there exist a liquidity premium
on public debt and bonds affect inflation dynamics and vice versa. Then, in a monetary
equilibrium, the government budget constraint can be satisfied for different combinations of
inflation and debt. Thus, self-fulfilling beliefs that deliver multiple steady states are possible.
Moreover, traditional passive/active policy prescriptions are not always useful in delivering
determinate equilibria. However, monetary and fiscal policies can be used as an equilibrium
selection device. We find that, with a low inflation target, active monetary policies are more
likely to deliver real and nominal determinacy and further amplify the effectiveness of these
policies in reducing steady state inflation.
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1 Introduction
When markets are complete and under standard assumptions,1 Barro (1974) shows that Ricardian
equivalence holds. In those environments, the channels through which fiscal policy might influ-
ence inflation dynamics are rather limited.2 In this paper, we study monetary and fiscal policy
interactions when markets are incomplete and in the context of the Great Moderation. During
the Great Moderation, the world witnessed several financial innovations that helped mitigating
such market incompleteness. Among those, here we focus on the role of secondary markets for
government bonds.3 These markets other than providing an additional opportunity for house-
hold’s to re-adjust their portfolios, they also change the inherent links between monetary and
fiscal policies. This is the case as prices of the primary issuance of public debt also incorporates
the value associated of trading these assets, in the future, in secondary markets. This additional
feature greatly alters relative prices. Here we explore such consequences.
To study monetary and fiscal policy interactions, we consider simple policy rules. We do so
in the context of a frictional, stochastic and incomplete market framework, where agents can
trade in secondary markets for public debt. As a result, the liquidity services for public debt
are an equilibrium outcome that is not only functions of the primitives of the environment but
also of the policy rules.4 We find that inflation and bond dynamics crucially depend on whether
agents participate in secondary markets or not. When there is no trade in these markets, we
show that there exists a unique monetary steady state, where public debt does not affect inflation
dynamics. However, when there is trade and bonds are scarce, public debt exhibits a liquidity
premium. Agents are willing to buy additional bonds to increase their consumption possibilities in
frictional goods markets. As result, Ricardian equivalence breaks down. By issuing less bonds, the
government can affect the premium and reduce the inflation rate. Thus, the resulting equilibrium
open market operations in this economy are quite different compared to environments with no bond
premia.5 As a result, the traditional prescriptions of active/passive monetary and fiscal policies
based in complete and frictionless financial markets do not always deliver locally determinate
equilibria in our environment.6
1Those standard assumptions are rational homogenous agents, lump sum taxes and no liquidity constraints.
2These different views on how to determine the price level (the ones proposed by Friedman (1968) and propo-
nents of the fiscal theory of the price level) critically depend on having rational expectations, lump sum taxation,
government bonds not providing liquidity services and having frictionless financial markets. We refer to Sargent
and Wallace (1981) and Leeper (1991) among others for more on such interactions.
3From 1986 to 1993, the volume of secondary market sovereign debt sales in the U.S. increased from $7 to $273
Billion. We refer to Power (1996) for more on the evolution of secondary markets.
4The way monetary and fiscal policies interact critically depends on the beliefs about future inflation. These
beliefs are not only influenced by fiscal and monetary policies, as noted by Sargent and Wallace (1981) and Leeper
(1991), but also by financial frictions, as highlighted by Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010), Leeper and Nason (2015),
and Gomes and Seoane (2015), among others.
5We refer to the seminal paper by Wallace (1981) that establishes the conditions whereby open market operations
do not alter real allocations.
6That is also the case once agents are boundedly rational, as in Evans and Honkapohja (2007) or Eusepi and
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When agents trade in secondary markets and bonds are scarce, the government is able to affect
the real return on public debt through changes in the inflation rate as well as the issuance of public
debt. As a result, there are different combinations of inflation and real public debt that satisfy the
same government budget constraint. Thus, self-fulfilling beliefs that are consistent with existence
of multiple steady states are possible. Changes in policies can then imply very different equilibrium
allocations. Finally, regardless of how many steady states exist, we show that traditional active
monetary policies decrease the steady state inflation, while passive monetary policies increase it.
In our numerical exercise, calibrated to the Pre Great Moderation period, we find that re-
gardless of the fiscal policy stance, active monetary policies are more likely to deliver a unique
monetary steady state. Whenever the steady state is unique, we find that a passive monetary
policy delivers locally indeterminate equilibria regardless of the fiscal stance. At the same time,
active monetary policies deliver determinacy independent of fiscal policy being active or passive.
In contrast, passive monetary policy can lead to multiple steady states, one is stable while the
other is unstable. These findings critically depend on the long run inflation target.7 When the
inflation target is high, two steady states may exist even under active monetary policies, one of
them being locally indeterminate. However, when the central bank follows an active policy and
has a low inflation target, then these policies are likely to deliver a unique and stable monetary
equilibrium, regardless of the fiscal stance. This finding suggests that active monetary polices can
be used as an equilibrium selection device. Lastly, we find that secondary markets tend to reduce
the stabilizing effect of monetary policy and depending on the stance of monetary policy, they
strengthen or weaken the stabilizing effect of fiscal policy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a literature review. Section 3 illustrates
the mechanism by presenting a simple cashless model with an ad hoc bond premium. Section 4
describes the environment with an endogenous liquidity premium and characterizes the monetary
equilibria. Section 5 presents the monetary equilibrium. In Section 6 we perform a numerical
analysis. A conclusion then follows.
2 Literature Review
Our paper relates to a growing literature that consider environments with a bond premium and
studies monetary and fiscal policy interactions. One of the earlier works is that of Canzoneri
Preston (2011, 2017), taxes are distortionary as in Canzoneri et al. (2016), government bonds provide liquidity
services, as in Canzoneri et al. (2005, 2016) and Andolfatto and Williamson (2015), when there is uncertainty
regarding the underlying policy regime, as in Davig and Leeper (2011), financial markets are not complete, as
in Gomis-Porqueras (2016) and Cui (2016), or when and how central bank revenues are transferred to the fiscal
authority as in Bassetto and Cui (2017).
7In environments with sticky prices and complete financial markets, Ascari and Ropele (2009), among others,
also show that the long run inflation target affects the usefulness of the Taylor principle. We obtain similar insights
in a flexible price environment with incomplete markets.
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and Diba (2005) who consider an endowment economy with a modified cash in advance constraint
framework, where bonds can be used to pay for goods. They do so by specifying an exogenous bond
liquidity service function. Once bonds provide liquidity, fiscal policy becomes a key determinant
for inflation dynamics. As a result a peg interest rate and a passive fiscal rule can yield locally
determinate equilibria. Using a similar environment, Andolfatto and Williamson (2015) allow
government debt to be used as payment in some states of the world. The authors show that under
an indefinite zero interest rate policy non-deflationary periods are possible when bonds have a
liquidity premium. As a result, traditional monetary and fiscal policy interactions at the zero
lower bound are quite different from traditional frameworks. Within the same spirit, Bassetto and
Cui (2017) show that when there is a liquidity premium on government debt, additional Taylor
rule perils emerge when the economy faces persistently low real interest rate. When agents face
frictional and stochastic trading opportunities and nominal government bonds as collateral in
secured lending arrangements, Berensten and Waller (2016) show that if the collateral constraint
binds, agents price in a liquidity premium on bonds that lowers the real rate on bonds. As a
result, the market value of the government debt can fluctuate even though there are no changes
to current or future taxes or spending. The price dynamics can be driven solely by the liquidity
premium on the debt. Finally, Cui (2016) augments the standard New Keynesian model with
privately issued claims that are only partially saleable and have a bid-ask spread. A higher level
of real government debt enhances the liquidity of entrepreneurs’ portfolios and raises investment.
However, the issuance of debt also raises the cost of financing government expenditures. A long-run
optimal supply of government debt emerges.
In contrast to the previous papers, our framework considers trading in a decentralized financial
market for government debt. Given market incompleteness in some markets, which require fiat
money, trading in secondary markets can deliver an endogenous liquidity premium. These sec-
ondary markets are over the counter which are characterized by search and bargaining frictions.
These features directly and indirectly impact the resulting equilibrium liquidity premia.8 These
are considerations that have not being explored in previous work, when examining monetary and
fiscal policy interactions. Here we show that these details are not as innocuous as it may seem a
priori. Finally, in our environment agents can adjust their consumption through changes in their
labor income, thus we do not impose a negative relationship between fiat money and bonds, which
is what is implied by the augmented cash constraint in an endowment economy as in Canzoneri
and Diba (2005). Such restriction is important as it ensures a unique monetary equilibrium in
8The equilibrium liquidity premia has been extensively studied in environment where agents trade OTC sec-
ondary markets real assets for fiat money, showing that traditional monetary policy prescriptions need to be
modified. The seminal paper of Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2016) show that search and bargaining frictions
in the secondary asset market can improve welfare if inflation is low. When assets of different maturities are con-
sidered, Geromichalos, Herrenbrueck and Salyer (2016) find that long term assets have higher rates of return in
steady state to compensate agents for their relative lack of liquidity. Moreover, their framework predicts a steeper
yield curve for assets that trade in less liquid secondary markets.
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their paper and directly affects the potential open market operations that are consistent with
implementing a Taylor rule. As these operations change the relative prices, the class of monetary
and fiscal policies consistent with determinate equilibria are generally going to be different.
3 A Motivating Example
Let us consider a cashless endowment economy, with an ad hoc premium on government bonds.
The economy is populated by identical infinitely-lived households that discount the future at a rate
β ∈ (0, 1) and derive utility from consumption of a perishable good and a government that must
finance an exogenous stream of expenditures G > 0 by issuing nominal bonds Bt, and collecting
lump sum taxes, τt. We assume that those government bonds, Bt, provide liquidity services.
9 As
a result, they exhibit a premium, which we denote by s˜t+1 > 0.
The resulting equilibrium is characterized by the bond’s first order condition of the household,
that delivers the Fisher’s equation adjusted by the premium, and the evolution of real bonds
implied by the government budget constraint. More precisely, we have
Πt+1 = β (Rt + s˜t+1) , (1)
τt +
Bt
Pt
= G+Rt−1
Bt−1
Pt
, (2)
where Rt is the gross interest rate at time t, Πt+1 the inflation rate at t+ 1 and Pt the price level
at t. To implement monetary and fiscal policies, the government follows simple rules, given by
Rt = α0 + αΠt, (3)
τt = γ0 + γ
Bt−1
Pt−1
, (4)
where α0 and α (γ0 and γ) are the monetary (fiscal) policy parameters.
Once we impose the policy rules, the resulting inflation and bonds dynamics are then given by
Πt+1 = β (α0 + αΠt + s˜t+1) , (5)
bt = G− γ0 +
(
1
β
− γ − s˜t
Πt
)
bt−1, (6)
where bt denotes real bonds. We first analyze inflation and bond dynamics when there is no
premium. Then we consider a bond premium that depends on inflation and bonds. For comparison
purposes, we define traditionally active/passive policies termed by Leeper (1991), as follows.
9These services could come from bonds being used as a medium of exchange or as collateral for secured loans.
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Definition 1 Monetary policy is defined as traditionally active (passive) when βα > 1 (βα < 1)
and α0 < 0 (α0 > 0).
Definition 2 Fiscal policy is defined as traditionally active (passive) when 1
β
− γ > 1 ( 1
β
− γ < 1)
and γ0 > G (γ0 < G).
No Bond Premium
When bonds do not provide any liquidity services we have that s˜t+1 = 0 ∀t. We can then establish
the following result.
Lemma 1 With no premium, the stationary monetary equilibria has the following properties:
(i) The steady state is unique and delivers steady state inflation and bonds that satisfy Π0 =
βα0
(1−αβ) and b0 =
G−γ0
1−( 1β−γ)
, respectively.
(ii) Traditional active/passive monetary policies deliver locally determinate equilibria.
As we can see, when there is no premium, the economy does not have real indeterminacies and
we recover the same active/passive policy prescriptions that deliver local determinate equilibria
in the monetary environment of Leeper (1991) and the cashless framework of Woodford (1998).
Moreover, if there was a premium but that premium was independent of bonds and inflation, the
same result applies. We can then conclude that any type of market incompleteness that delivers
a premium that is independent of bonds and inflation does not alter the uniqueness of the steady
state equilibrium nor the traditional policy prescriptions that deliver locally determinate equilibria.
A Bond Premium
We now explore the equilibrium properties once agents face a premium on public debt that depends
on the fundamentals of the economy. In particular, we assume a premium that depends on both
real bonds bt and gross inflation Πt+1, which from now on we denote by s˜t+1(bt,Πt+1).
As we can see from equations (5)-(6), nominal government bonds are important for inflation
dynamics. In particular, now the fiscal authority has a direct impact on the evolution of inflation
through the amount of bonds that it issues via the liquidity premium. In this environment fiscal
policy matters, breaking the traditional dichotomy of monetary and fiscal policies observed in
frictionless and complete market environments. The results are summarized in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 1 With a premium s˜t+1(bt,Πt+1), the stationary monetary equilibria has the follow-
ing properties:
6
(i) The steady state is generically not unique and delivers steady state inflation and bonds that
satisfy Π = βα0+βs˜
(1−αβ) and b =
G−γ0
1−( 1β−γ)+ s˜Π
, respectively.
(ii) When monetary policy is traditionally active (passive), then Π < Π0 (Π > Π0).
(iii) Traditional active/passive monetary policies may not be useful in delivering locally determi-
nate equilibria.
All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Once public debt provides liquidity services, there can be different combinations of bonds and
inflation that satisfy the competitive equilibrium conditions. Thus, self-fulfilling beliefs that are
consistent with existence of multiple steady states are possible, delivering real indeterminacies.
Relative to an economy without a premium and irrespective of how many steady states exist, the
bond premia always decreases long run inflation when monetary policy is active and otherwise
when passive. Moreover, the resulting policy prescriptions for stability are likely to be different
from those obtained with no premium.
This motivating example illustrates the importance of providing explicit frictions in the eco-
nomic environment that yield bond premia when studying how monetary and fiscal policy interact.
This is the case as the details of the premium can deliver quite different equilibrium properties. In
the next sections we present a frictional framework that delivers a bond premia as an equilibrium
outcome. In particular, we consider a frictional, stochastic and incomplete market environment
based on Berentsen and Waller (2011).10 Such framework allows us to nest various economies that
differ in terms of the severity of the market incompleteness and the development of secondary
markets, which can give rise to the premium on government debt. Within this environment we
study the properties of the resulting monetary equilibria and analyze the underlying monetary and
fiscal policy interactions. Unless otherwise mentioned, the new environment retains the definitions
and notation of the motivating example.
4 The environment
The basic structure builds on the frictional and incomplete market framework of Berentsen and
Waller (2011). Time is discrete and there is a continuum of infinitively-lived agents of measure
one that, as before, discount the future at a rate β ∈ (0, 1). These agents have access to fiat
money and nominal government bonds. These are the only durable assets in the economy. As in
Lagos and Wright (2005), agents face preference shocks, have stochastic trading opportunities and
sequentially trade in various markets that are characterized by different frictions. In particular,
10Kocherlakota (2003) considers a similar environment where households use government bonds to relax liquidity
constraints.
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each period has three sub-periods. In the first one, after the preference shocks are realized, agents
have access to a decentralized secondary market for government debt (SM).11 In this market, gov-
ernment debt is traded for money in an over the counter (OTC) market, which is characterized
by search and bargaining frictions. A buyer (seller) is matched with a seller (buyer) with proba-
bility κ ∈ [0, 1].12 With complementary probability, a buyer and a seller are not matched, so they
cannot trade. In the second sub-period, agents can trade goods for fiat money in a decentralized
frictional goods market (DM). In this market, anonymous buyers and sellers are also randomly
and bilaterally matched. In particular, matches in DM are such that with probability σ ∈ (0, 1),
a buyer (seller) is matched with a seller (buyer).13 Finally, in the last sub-period, agents trade
in a frictionless centralized market (CM), where they can produce and consume a general good,
re-adjust their portfolio as well as pay their taxes.14
4.1 Preferences and Technologies
Agents have preferences over consumption of the general CM perishable good (xt), effort to produce
the CM good (ht), consumption of the specialized DM perishable good (qt) and effort to produce
the DM good (et). Their expected utility is then given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ln(xt)− ht + χ q
1−ξ
t
1− ξ − et
]
, (7)
where χ > 0 captures the relative weight on DM consumption and ξ ∈ (0, 1) is the inverse of
the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of DM consumption. Finally, E0 denotes the linear
expectation operator with respect to an equilibrium distribution of idiosyncratic agent types.
All perishable goods in the economy are produced according to a linear technology where labor
is the only input. The production function is such that one unit of labor yields one unit of output.
11In contrast to Berentsen and Waller (2011), we consider an over the counter market rather than a competitive
market. This is the case as secondary markets for public debt around the world are mostly structured as OTC
markets with bargaining and search/informational frictions, rather than competitive financial markets.
12The value of κ captures the accessibility of these secondary markets faced by agents.
13The magnitude of σ give us the degree of market incompleteness faced by agents.
14An alternative specification to the DM/CM structure to generate a demand for money would be a cash/credit
framework, as in Lucas and Stokey (1983). However, such environments imply a constant velocity of money and no
variability in the demand for liquidity, features that we do not want to impose in our environment. Such properties
restrict how the government implements open market operations (exchanging bonds for money) that are going to
be consistent with a central bank following a Taylor rule and having a fiscal rule that links taxes to government
debt. Given that the underlying economy is frictional and incomplete, this allows the possibility for open market
operation to have real effects. Thus imposing the underlying restrictions of the cash/credit framework are not
innocuous when thinking about monetary and fiscal policies that deliver determinate equilibria.
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4.2 Government
In addition to lump sum CM taxes τCMt and nominal bonds, the government can print fiat money
Mt to finance the expenditures G. The corresponding government budget constraint is now given
by
τCMt + φtMt + φtBt = G+ φtMt−1 + φtRt−1Bt−1; (8)
where φt ≡ 1Pt is the real price of money in terms of the CM good. The real value of bond issues
is assumed to be bounded above by a sufficiently large constant to avoid Ponzi schemes.
To implement monetary policy, the central bank follows a Taylor rule so that nominal interest
rates are linked to inflation. This can be achieved through appropriate open market operations in
CM. The fiscal authority considers a rule, whereby taxes are related to the previous level of real
debt. These simple rules are given by
Rt = α0 + α Πt, (9)
τCMt = γ0 + γ φt−1Bt−1, (10)
where, as before, α0, α, γ0 and γ determine the responsiveness of monetary and fiscal rules to
inflation and real debt, respectively. While typically these policy rules may not be optimal, these
rules have been extensively analyzed in the macroeconomic literature as stabilization tools. More
precisely, particular combinations of monetary (α) and fiscal (γ) policies, as in the definitions of
traditionally active/passive of our motivating example, are known to deliver locally determinate
equilibria under various environments with frictionless financial markets.
It is important to highlight that the underlying open market operations consistent with the
implementation of monetary and fiscal policy can have real effects when agents trade in frictional
and incomplete markets. Thus not having an equilibrium money to bond ratio is not without loss
of generality.
4.3 Agent’s Problem
Given the sequential nature of the problem, we solve the representative agent’s problem backwards.
Thus we first solve the CM problem, then the DM and finally solve the SM problem, respectively.
4.3.1 CM Problem
In this market, all agents can produce and consume the general consumption good, xt and trade
in a frictionless competitive market. Thus, a medium of exchange is not essential in CM. Agents
can settle their CM trades with any assets, CM goods or CM labor.
An agent in period t enters CM with a portfolio of fiat money (M˜t−1) and nominal government
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bonds (B˜t−1). This portfolio is different across agents, depending on the type of preference shock
they have previously received. In particular, the portfolio when entering CM reflects whether they
were able to trade in SM or not and if they had the opportunity to trade in the previous DM.
We refer the reader to the Appendix for the various initial CM portfolios before trade occurs that
agents can have.
Given the portfolio (M˜t−1, B˜t−1), the problem of the representative agent in CM can be written
as follows
W (M˜t−1, B˜t−1) = max
xt,ht,Mt,Bt
{
ln(xt)− ht + β V SM(Mt, Bt)
}
s.t. xt + φtMt + φtBt = ht − τCMt + φtM˜t−1 + φtRt−1B˜t−1, (11)
where V SM is the expected value function of an agent for the next period SM. After the preference
shock has been realized, agents may have the possibility to trade in SM and adjust their liquidity,
by trading fiat money for nominal bonds.
The corresponding first order conditions are given by
1
xt
− 1 = 0, (12)
−φt + β ∂V
SM(Mt, Bt)
∂Mt
= 0, (13)
−φt + β ∂V
SM(Mt, Bt)
∂Bt
= 0, (14)
and the associated envelope conditions are ∂Wt
∂Mt−1
= φt and
∂Wt
∂Bt−1
= φtRt−1.
4.3.2 DM Problem
Before CM and right after SM, buyers/sellers enter DM. This market is characterized by random
and bilateral trading opportunities as well as a lack of record-keeping services. Matches in DM
are such that with probability σ ∈ (0, 1), a buyer (seller) is matched with a seller (buyer). As
in Aruoba and Chugh (2010), Berentsen and Waller (2011) and Mart´ın (2011), among others,
government bonds are viewed as book-entries in the government’s record.15 Since sellers do not
have access to record-keeping services in this market, nominal bonds will not be accepted as a
means of payment in DM. Moreover, since agents are anonymous, sellers are not going to extend
unsecured credit to buyers when purchasing DM goods. Thus, the only feasible trade is the
exchange of DM goods for fiat money.
15Alternatively, this could be interpreted as a fraction of sellers where government bonds are not recognized as
in Shi (2014) or Rocheteau, Wright and Xiao (2016). This could be endogenized as in Lester et al. (2012) or as Li
et al. (2012). This treatment is beyond the scope of this paper.
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An agent in period t enters DM with a portfolio of fiat money (Mˆt−1) and nominal government
bonds (Bˆt−1). These will differ across agents depending on the preference shock they have received
at the beginning of the period as well as their trading opportunities in SM. We refer the reader
to the Appendix for these various portfolios.
The expected utility of a buyer that has traded in the previous SM and enters DM with a
portfolio (Mˆt−1, Bˆt−1) is then given by
V DMb,κ (Mˆt−1, Bˆt−1) = σ
[
χ
qSt
1−ξ
1− ξ +W (Mˆt−1 −D
Ms
t , Bˆt−1)
]
+ (1− σ)W (Mˆt−1, Bˆt−1),
where qSt denotes the DM quantity of goods purchased in DM when the buyer has traded in SM
and DMst represents the corresponding cash payment. By feasibility, buyers cannot pay more than
the fiat money they brought into the match so that DMst ≤ Mˆt−1.
When the buyer has not been able to trade in SM, his expected utility entering DM with a
portfolio (Mˆt−1, Bˆt−1) is then given by
V DMb,1−κ(Mˆt−1, Bˆt−1) = σ
[
χ
qt
1−ξ
1− ξ +W (Mˆt−1 −D
M
t , Bˆt−1)
]
+ (1− σ)W (Mˆt−1, Bˆt−1),
where qt denotes the DM quantity of goods consumed in DM when the buyer has not traded in SM
and DMt is the corresponding cash payment. As in the previous state of the world, buyers cannot
pay more than the fiat money they brought into the match, thus we have that DMt ≤ Mˆt−1. Note
that these buyers will have fewer cash balances to buy in DM, as they did not have an opportunity
to rebalance their portfolio in the secondary market.
Similarly, the expected utility of a seller that has traded in the previous SM and enters DM
with a portfolio (Mˆt−1, Bˆt−1) is given by
V DMs,κ (Mˆt−1, Bˆt−1) = σ
[
−qSt +W (Mˆt−1 +DMst , Bˆt−1)
]
+ (1− σ)W (Mˆt−1, Bˆt−1),
while the expected utility of a seller that has not traded in the previous SM and enters DM with
a portfolio (Mˆt−1, Bˆt−1) is given by
V DMs,1−κ(Mˆt−1, Bˆt−1) = σ
[
−qt +W (Mˆt−1 +DMt , Bˆt−1)
]
+ (1− σ)W (Mˆt−1, Bˆt−1).
The terms of trade in DM are determined ex-post by a buyer take it or leave it offer. In order
to induce trade in DM, buyers need to offer terms of trade that satisfy the seller’s participation
constraint and their cash feasibility constraint. For buyers that have not been able to trade in the
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previous SM, the terms of trade solve the following problem
max
qt,DMt
{
χ
qt
1−ξ
1− ξ +W (Mb,t−1 −D
M
t , Bb,t−1)
}
s.t.
Mb,t−1−DMt ≥ 0,
−qt +W (Ms,t−1+DMt , Bs,t−1) ≥ W (Ms,t−1, Bs,t−1),
where Mb,t−1(Ms,t−1) and Bb,t−1(Bs,t−1) represent the buyer’s (seller’s) fiat money and nominal
bond holdings, respectively, when trading in DM. The previous problem yields the following first
order conditions
χ
qtξ
= 1 + λt,
λt(Mb,t−1 −DMt ) = 0,
qt = φtD
M
t ,
where λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the payment feasibility constraint. It
is important to note that the optimal terms of trade do not depend on whether the seller has
previously traded in SM or not. This is the case as the CM value function is linear.
Similarly, for buyers that have been able to trade in the previous SM, the terms of trade in
DM are given by
χ
qSt
ξ
= 1 + λst ,
λst(Mb,t−1 +D
Mo
t −DMst ) = 0,
qSt = φtD
Ms
t ;
where λst represents the Lagrange multiplier associated with the payment feasibility constraint
when the agent has previously traded in SM. Relative to the previous case, here buyers have
access to more fiat money as they have been able to trade some bonds for fiat money in the
previous SM.
These various terms of trade imply the following envelope conditions for fiat money
∂V DMb,κ
∂Mb,t−1
= σ
[
χ
qSt
ξ
∂qSt
∂Mb,t−1
− φt ∂D
Ms
t
∂Mb,t−1
+ φt
]
+ (1− σ)φt,
∂V DMb,1−κ
∂Mb,t−1
= σ
[
χ
qtξ
∂qt
∂Mb,t−1
− φt ∂D
M
t
∂Mb,t−1
+ φt
]
+ (1− σ)φt,
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while for bonds we have that
∂V DMb,κ
∂Bb,t−1
=
∂V DMb,1−κ
∂Bb,t−1
= φtRt−1.
For the seller, we obtain similar envelope expressions, which are given by
∂V DMs,κ
∂Ms,t−1
= φt,
∂V DMs,1−κ
∂Ms,t−1
= φt,
∂V DMs,κ
∂Bs,t−1
=
∂V DMs,1−κ
∂Bs,t−1
= φtRt−1.
Throughout the rest of the paper we focus on monetary equilibria with positive nominal interest
rates so that Rt > 1. This type of equilibria then implies that λt > 0, so that buyers that have not
been able to trade in the previous SM spend all their money when purchasing DM goods. Thus
we have that
∂DMt
∂Mt−1
= 1. For buyers that were able to trade in the SM, their cash constraint may
or not bind.
4.3.3 SM Problem
At the beginning of each period, agents experience a preference shock that determines whether
they are a buyer or a seller in the ensuing DM. After this preference shock is realized, agents
enter a secondary market for government debt where they can re-adjust their portfolio according
to their new liquidity needs. The SM is an OTC financial market that is characterized by random
trading opportunities and bargaining.16 Matches in this market are such that with probability
κ ∈ [0, 1], a buyer (seller) is matched with a seller (buyer). With complementary probability, a
buyer (seller) is not matched, thus cannot trade in SM.
The expected utility of an agent entering SM with a portfolio (Mt−1, Bt−1) is then given by
V SM(Mt−1, Bt−1) =
1
2
[
κ V DMb,κ (Mt−1+atD
Bo
t , Bt−1−DB
o
t ) + (1− κ) V DMb,1−κ(Mt−1, Bt−1)
]
+
+
1
2
[
κ V DMs,κ (Mt−1−atDB
o
t , Bt−1+D
Bo
t ) + (1− κ) V DMs,1−κ(Mt−1, Bt−1)
]
,
where 1
2
reflects that an agent has equal probability to be either a buyer or a seller in the ensuing
DM and V DMj,n represents the value function of trading in DM where j = {b, s} and n = {κ, 1−κ}.
The terms of trade in the OTC market are (at, D
Bo
t ), where at denotes the price per unit of
bonds and atD
Bo
t represents the total units of money received by the buyer. These terms of trade
are determined ex-post by a buyer take it or leave it offer. It is important to note that when
determining the terms of trade, agents do not know if they will have an opportunity to trade in
the ensuing DM. Moreover, the threat point of both the buyer and seller is to not trade in the
OTC. This is equivalent to the value of not having had the opportunity to trade in the OTC.
16Berentsen et al. (2014) consider a similar environment where agents face an exogenous probability that dictates
whether they can participate or not in a competitive and Walrasian secondary market for government debt.
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Thus, the terms of trade in the OTC solves the following problem
max
at,DB
o
t
{
V DMb,κ − V DMb,1−κ
}
s.t.
V DMs,κ − V DMs,1−κ ≥ 0,
atD
Bo
t ≤Ms,t−1,
DB
o
t ≤ Bb,t−1.
Using the previous expressions for the DM value functions, the OTC terms of trade can then be
written as follows
max
at,DB
o
t
{
σ
[
χ
qSt
1−ξ − qt1−ξ
1− ξ + φt
(
DMt −DMst
)]
+ φt
(
atD
Bo
t −DB
o
t
)}
s.t.
σ
[−qSt + qt − φt (DMt −DMst )]− φt (atDBot −DBot )≥0,
atD
Bo
t ≤Ms,t−1,
DB
o
t ≤ Bb,t−1.
Using that the differential payment in DM for the two different states of the world in SM is
DMt −DMst = −atDBot , and that the amount produced in DM for buyers that have traded in SM
is qSt = φt
(
Mt−1 + atDB
o
t
)
, the corresponding first-order conditions for at and D
Bo
t are given by
at : σ
{
χ
(
qSt
)−ξ − 1}+ 1− ot − µst = 0,
DB
o
t : atσ
{
χ
(
qSt
)−ξ − 1}+ (at − 1)− ot (at − 1)− µstat − µbt = 0,
where µst (µ
b
t) corresponds to the Lagrange multiplier of the seller (buyer) when trading in SM.
From the first order condition, we have that ot = σ
{
χ
(
qSt
)−ξ − 1}+ 1− µst . From the second
optimality condition, we can then establish the following
σ
{
χ
(
qSt
)−ξ − 1}− µst − µbt = 0.
Since µst and µ
b
t are non-negative, we have that σ(χ
(
qSt
)−ξ−1)−µst ≥ 0, which in turn implies
that ot ≥ 1 > 0. Thus, the terms of trade in the OTC market are such that the seller just gets
the outside option. Using qSt = φt
(
Mt−1 + atDB
o
t
)
, qt = φtMt−1 and DMt −DMst = −atDBot , it is
easy to show that the equilibrium price is at = 1. In addition, in equilibrium, (D
Bo
t µ
s
t , µ
b
t) must
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satisfy the following conditions
(
Ms,t−1 −DBot
)
µst = 0, and D
Bo
t ≤Ms,t−1,(
Bb,t−1 −DBot
)
µbt = 0, and D
Bo
t ≤ Bb,t−1,
σ
{
χ
(
qSt
)−ξ − 1}− µst − µbt = 0.
There are four possible terms of trade that can be observed in equilibrium.
Case 1. The bond and fiat money payments bind in SM, which implies
µst > 0, and D
Bo
t = Ms,t−1,
µbt > 0, and D
Bo
t = Bb,t−1,
σ
{
χ
(
qSt
)−ξ − 1} = µst + µbt .
Case 2. Only the fiat money payment in SM is binding, which implies17
µst = σ
{
χ
(
qSt
)−ξ − 1} > 0, and DBot = Ms,t−1,
µbt = 0, and D
Bo
t < Bb,t−1.
Case 3. When only the bond payment in SM is binding, the terms of trade are such that
µst = 0, and D
Bo
t < Ms,t−1,
µbt = σ
{
χ
(
qSt
)−ξ − 1} > 0, and DBot = Bb,t−1.
Case 4. When none of the payments bind, then the terms of trade are given by DB
o
t < Ms,t−1,
DB
o
t < Bs,t−1, µ
s
t = µ
b
t = 0 and agents achieve the first-best DM consumption, χ
(
qSt
)−ξ
= 1.
Having characterized all possible terms of trade, we can determine the properties of the SM
value function. An agent at the beginning of the period, before the preference shocks and trading
opportunities have been realized, has an expected SM value function that is given by
V SM(Mt−1, Bt−1) =
1
2
[
κ V DMb,κ (Mt−1+atD
Bo
t , Bt−1−DB
o
t ) + (1− κ) V DMb,1−κ(Mt−1, Bt−1)
]
1
2
[
κ V DMs,κ (Mt−1−atDB
o
t , Bt−1+D
Bo
t ) + (1− κ) V DMs,1−κ(Mt−1, Bt−1)
]
+
1
2
ot
[
V DMs,κ − V DMs,1−κ
]
+
1
2
µstφt
(
Ms,t−1 − atDBot
)
+
1
2
µbtφt
(
Bb,t−1 −DBot
)
.
17In our paper, the monetary authority does not participate in secondary markets. For this equilibrium, however,
and as individuals are short of money but not short of bonds, it may be optimal for the monetary authority to
participate and purchase government bonds in order to inject liquidity. That policy action would allow SM buyers
to consume more and therefore has the potential to increase welfare.
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To be able to determine the optimal portfolio allocation, given by equations (13) and (14), we
need to calculate the marginal effect of bringing an additional unit of money and nominal bonds
in SM. Using previous results, we have that
∂V SM(Mt−1, Bt−1)
∂Mt−1
= φt + φt
1
2
σ
[
κ
(
χ
qSt
ξ
− 1
)
+ (1− κ)
(
χ
qtξ
− 1
)]
+
1
2
φtµ
s
t ,
∂V SM(Mt−1, Bt−1)
∂Bt−1
= φtRt−1 +
1
2
φtµ
b
t ,
which imply the following CM inter-temporal Euler equations
φt = βφt+1
{
1 +
1
2
σ
[
κ
(
χ
qSt+1
ξ
− 1
)
+ (1− κ)
(
χ
qt+1ξ
− 1
)]
+
1
2
µst+1
}
, (15)
φt = βφt+1
(
Rt +
1
2
µbt+1
)
. (16)
5 Monetary Equilibrium
Given the policy rules (Rt = α0 + αΠt & τ
CM
t = γ0 + γφt−1Bt−1) public spending {G}∞t=0 and
initial conditions (M−1, B−1), a dynamic monetary equilibrium is a sequence of consumptions{
xt, qt, q
S
t
}∞
t=0
, assets and prices
{
Mt, Bt, D
Bo
t , φt+1, at, µb,t, µs,t
}∞
t=0
satisfying market clearing and
agents’ problem, which imply the following conditions
xt = 1, (17)
qt = φtMt−1, (18)
qSt = φt(Mt−1 + atD
Bo
t ), (19)
at = 1, (20)(
Ms,t−1 −DBot
)
µst = 0, and D
Bo
t ≤Ms,t−1, (21)(
Bb,t−1 −DBot
)
µbt = 0, and D
Bo
t ≤ Bb,t−1, (22)
σ
{
χ
(
qSt
)−ξ − 1}− µst − µbt = 0, (23)
φt = βφt+1
(
Rt +
1
2
µbt+1
)
, (24)
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φt = βφt+1
{
1 +
1
2
σ
[
κ
(
χ
qSt+1
ξ
− 1
)
+ (1− κ)
(
χ
qt+1ξ
− 1
)]
+
1
2
µst+1
}
, (25)
τCMt + φtMt + φtBt = G+ φtMt−1 + φtRt−1Bt−1. (26)
Depending whether agents, face market incompleteness, have the possibility to trade in SM,
and, if they do, whether the various multipliers are strictly positive or not, we are going to observe
different prices and interest rates. These various scenarios will result in vastly different inflation
and bond dynamics.
5.1 No Trading in Secondary Markets
Here we analyze two extreme situations. One where the economy has market incompleteness with
fewer financial innovations, and one that has secondary markets.
Incomplete and Less Developed Financial Markets
In this equilibrium agents do not trade in secondary markets for public debt, which implies κ = 0.
Agents also face market incompleteness in DM so that fiat money is required to purchase DM
goods. This implies that 0 < σ < 1. The resulting monetary equilibrium is described by the
evolution of inflation, Πt+1, and real bond holdings bt = φtBt. These are given by
Πt+1 = β(α0 + αΠt),
bt = G− γ0 +
(
1
β
− γ
)
bt−1 +
mt−1
Πt
−mt,
where mt = φtMt denotes real money balances that satisfy the following condition
1
2
σ
(
χ
Πξt+1
mtξ
− 1
)
= α0 + αΠt − 1.
As we can see, the evolution of future inflation is independent of real government bonds, as in
Leeper (1991), among others. For our environment, we find the following results.
Proposition 2 The stationary monetary equilibrium of an economy where agents cannot trade in
SM is unique. Traditional active/passive monetary and fiscal policy prescriptions deliver locally
determinate equilibria.
In an incomplete market economy where agents cannot trade in secondary markets, bonds are
priced fundamentally and Ricardian equivalence holds. As a result, the steady state inflation is
unique and equal to Π = βα0
(1−αβ) . For comparison purposes, from now we denote such long run
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inflation as Π0. For this equilibrium, we obtain the same stabilization policy prescription as in
Leeper (1991) or Woodford (1994, 1998); where traditionally active (passive) monetary policy
βα > 1 (βα < 1) together with passive (active) fiscal policy 1
β
− γ < 1 ( 1
β
− γ > 1) yield locally
determinate equilibria.
Complete Markets
Here we characterize an equilibrium for an economy where agents do not face market incomplete-
ness in DM. This implies that σ = 0. The only market where agents trade is CM where any
medium of exchange is available to agents. Note that in such environment, agents will decide not
to carry real balances across periods, as it is costly. As a result, agents will choose not to trade in
secondary markets for public debt. The resulting monetary equilibrium is given by
Πt+1 = β(α0 + αΠt),
bt = G− γ0 +
(
1
β
− γ
)
bt−1.
As we can see, we recover the same decoupled dynamic monetary equilibrium as in the friction-
less and cashless environments of Woodford (1998). Moreover, the evolution of future inflation is
independent of real government bonds, as in Leeper (1991) and Woodford (1998), among others.
Proposition 3 The stationary monetary equilibrium of a complete market economy where agents
do not trade in SM is unique. Traditional active/passive monetary and fiscal policy prescriptions
deliver locally determinate equilibria.
In this economy bonds are also priced fundamentally and Ricardian equivalence also holds.
Thus inflation expectations generated in this monetary equilibrium are the same as those observed
when agents face incomplete markets but do not have access to secondary markets. The resulting
properties are also consistent with models with frictionless and perfect financial markets of Leeper
(1991) and others. We can conclude that not having a premium in bonds is key in delivering
traditional results, not the severity of the market incompleteness.
5.2 Trading in Secondary Markets
We now explore the implications for the resulting monetary equilibrium for economies with κ > 0
and σ > 0, so that agents can trade in SM. When characterizing the monetary equilibria, we
established that depending on the fundamentals of the economy, we can observe four different
types of monetary equilibria. Case 1 is consistent with a wide range of interest rates. In contrast,
Cases 2 and 3 occur only for a small measure of nominal interest rates. Case 4 would satiate the
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buyers’ money demand. In what follows, we focus on the dynamic monetary equilibrium of Case
1, where agents trade SM and their corresponding cash and bond constraints bind.18
This dynamic monetary equilibrium is given by the following evolution of inflation and bonds
Πt+1 = βα0 + βαΠt + βs˜t+1, (27)
bt =
1
2
(G− γ0) + 1
2
(
1
β
− γ + (1− s˜t)
Πt
)
bt−1, (28)
where the liquidity premium s˜t+1 ≡ 12µbt+1 equals s˜t+1 = 12
(
θˆt+1 + (1− σ)− (α0 + αΠt)
)
, with
θˆt+1 =
1
2
σχ
(
Πt+1
2bt
)ξ [
1 + κ+ (1− κ) 2ξ] . After repeated substitution, the dynamic monetary equi-
librium can be written as
Πt+1 =
β
2
(
α0 + αΠt + θˆt+1 + 1− σ
)
, (29)
bt =
1
2
(G− γ0) +
[
1
β
− 1
2
γ +
1
2
(
1− θˆt − (1− σ)
) 1
Πt
]
bt−1. (30)
Note that θˆt+1 depends negatively on the ratio
(
bt
Πt+1
)
. We can then conclude that an economy
with market incompleteness and trading in secondary markets for debt can generate a premia on
bonds that depends on both bonds and inflation. We have thus provided micro foundations that
generate the properties we considered in the motivating example.19
As we can see, when buyers and sellers trade in SM and both of their payment constraints
bind, the evolution of inflation depends on the bond liquidity premium. As a result, inflation
dynamics are affected by real government bonds. Now, the fiscal authority has a direct impact on
the evolution of inflation through the amount of bonds that it issues.20 This is a direct consequence
of having an incomplete frictional goods market, where the only feasible trade is one where goods
are exchanged with fiat money. As a result, by previously trading government bonds, buyers can
expand their consumption possibilities in the incomplete and frictional goods market. Then, the
price that agents are willing to pay is above its fundamental value, thus delivering a liquidity
premium and breaking the Ricardian equivalence. Note that the fiscal authority, by changing the
amount of bonds that are issued, can directly affect the liquidity premium and therefore affect
the inflation dynamics. This in sharp contrast to cashless environments with frictionless financial
markets (Woodford (1998)) or even monetary economies with frictionless financial markets (Leeper
(1991), Woodford (1994) or Sims (1994), among others). In these different environments, the
18For this equilibrium, the cash constraint in DM binds even for those who traded in SM, i.e. λst > 0. This
implies that bonds are scarce.
19We refer the reader to the Appendix for the details of the derivation found in the text.
20In environments with frictionless and complete financial markets, as in Leeper (1991), Woodford (1994), Sims
(1994) among others, bonds do not affect for inflation dynamics.
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implied open market operations required to implement the Taylor rule are quite different.
Finally, as in Berensten and Waller (2016), when public bonds exhibit a liquidity premium, the
market value of government liabilities can fluctuate even though there are no changes to current
or future taxes or spending. Price dynamics can be driven solely by the liquidity premium on
public debt.
Given these equilibrium properties, it is not too surprising that in this non-Ricardian environ-
ment, the underlying wealth and substitution effects when revaluing public debt, through changes
in price levels, are drastically different to environments without a liquidity premium. Thus we ex-
pect that traditional active/passive monetary and fiscal policy prescriptions are unlikely to deliver
locally determinate equilibria.
Next we examine some of the properties of these monetary equilibria. We first consider the
implications for stationary monetary equilibria.
Lemma 2 Consider the monetary equilibrium where buyers and sellers in SM trade and are con-
strained. When monetary policy is traditionally passive (active), the steady state inflation, Π, is
higher (lower) than the one with no SM, Π0.
This result is independent of the underlying mechanism that leads to a positive government
debt premium. All is needed is that such premium exists and that monetary policy follows the
Taylor rule. This finding then suggests that trading in secondary markets, consistent with the
Great Moderation, can further amplify the effectiveness of active monetary policies in reducing
steady state inflation.
Proposition 4 The stationary monetary equilibrium of an economy where buyers and sellers in
SM trade and are constrained is generically not unique.
This multiplicity result is similar to the one obtained by Bassetto and Cui (2017) and related
to the real indeterminacy found in Benhabib et al. (2001). As in Benhabib et al. (2001), the
non-linearities in the inflation dynamics are key in delivering real indeterminacies. However,
the mechanism that generates the multiplicity of steady states in this paper is different. In our
environment, it is a direct consequence of the liquidity properties of government bonds. Given that
bonds are scarce, the liquidity premium is affected by bonds outstanding. This implies that the
nominal interest rate depends on the level of real bonds. As a result, the total interest payment on
bonds is non-linear, generating a relative bond seigniorage that is entirely driven by the liquidity
needs of DM buyers. In this equilibrium, buyers are willing to pay prices for government bonds
that are above their fundamental value.21 Now the government cannot only affect the relative bond
seigniorage through inflation, now the actual size of the public debt also affects it; which we refer
21This bond liquidity Laffer curve effect is also found in Gomis-Porqueras (2016).
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as the bond liquidity Laffer curve. This new fiscal environment critically alters the expectations
about future inflation, as the fiscal backing of bonds is different to an economy without a liquidity
premium on government bonds. These liquidity features have important implications for the
evolution of inflation and public debt.
When multiple steady states are possible, we are faced with real indeterminacies. Moreover,
increased volatility can be observed as one can always construct sunspot equilibria between those
steady states.22 Are there any policies that can help rule-out real indeterminacies and reduce the
scope for additional volatility?
Proposition 5 When buyers and sellers in SM trade and are constrained, there exist adequate
monetary and fiscal policies ( 2
β
−α = 0, and 2−α+ γ = 0) that deliver a unique monetary steady
state.
As we can see, a traditional aggressive monetary policy (α > 2
β
) alone or an aggressive monetary
coupled with an adequate fiscal policies (α = 2+γ) are able to rule-out real indeterminacies. These
results also imply, cetirus paribus, that aggressive monetary policies are more likely to generate a
unique monetary steady state. These policies then can be used as an equilibrium selection device.
Such policies can be welfare improving as they eliminate the possibility of sunspots equilibria and
the resulting volatility. This finding then suggests that having an aggressive monetary policy is
even more important during the Great Moderation, which was characterized by increased trading
in secondary markets.
Lemma 3 Traditional monetary and fiscal active/passive policy prescriptions are not useful in
delivering locally determinate equilibria.
It is easy to check that the values outside of the main diagonal in the Jacobian may not be
zero. In addition, the values in the main diagonal are different to the ones found when there was
no trade in SM. These results are a direct consequence of the liquidity premium on public debt,
as it affects both inflation dynamics and the tax burden. This feature creates a link between the
path of government debt, taxes and inflation. As a result, the effectiveness of government policies
cannot be independent of each other as both fiscal and monetary policies simultaneously affect the
monetary and fiscal eigenvalue. This is in sharp contrast to environments where financial markets
are complete and frictionless.
Lemma 4 The specifics of the monetary and fiscal rules (α0, α, γ0, γ) critically affect the steady
state values for inflation and real debt, which ultimately affect the effectiveness of traditional active
and passive policies (α, γ) in delivering locally determinate equilibria.
22We refer the reader to Azariadis (1981) and Cass and Shell (1983), among others, for more detailed discussion
on sunspot equilibria.
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In our environment, the steady state levels of inflation and real debt affect the nature of the
stabilization policies that rule out indeterminate equilibria. This is the case as the values of the
specific parameters of the monetary and fiscal rules (α0, α, γ0, γ) affect the position of the economy
in the bond liquidity Laffer curve. This in turn changes the potential for self-fulfilling values of real
bonds that are consistent with a balanced government budget constraint. More precisely, when a
liquidity premium exists, both inflation and the level of real debt affect the real rate of return on
public debt. As a result, there are different combinations of steady state inflation rates and real
debt that are consistent with the monetary equilibrium conditions. This is sharp contrast with
environments with complete financial markets and flexible prices, where the steady state levels of
inflation and real debt do not affect the local stability properties of the monetary equilibrium.23
Thus it is not surprising that the traditional prescriptions of active/passive monetary and fiscal
policies that deliver locally determinate equilibria are not always going to be operative in economies
where agents trade in secondary markets.
6 A Numerical Exploration
In this Section, we resort to numerical analysis to determine when the monetary equilibria is
locally determinate and unique. To do so, we need to parametrize the model. As a benchmark, we
consider an economy with incomplete markets (σ 6= 0) and no trade in secondary markets (κ = 0).
This scenario roughly captures the era before the Great Moderation, which we take to be from
1960 to 1984. Then we explore what are the consequences for monetary equilibria if agents in the
economy are able to trade in the secondary market for government debt. We do so for a variety
of monetary and fiscal stances.
To provide some discipline when deciding the parameter values, we proceed as follows. To
determine the underlying discount factor, we compute the average annual real interest rate from
1960 to 1984, which is 2.5%. This results in β = 0.9758. To pin down preferences parameters
for the DM utility, we choose ξ and χ to minimize the mean square error between the implied
money demand and the historical U.S. data.24 To determine G, γ0 and α0, we match the long-
run average from 1960-1984 of government spending to GDP, government debt to GDP and the
annual CPI inflation rate to be 20%, 34% and 5.27%, respectively.25 Finally, as changes in σ do
not significantly affect the fit of the money demand, we consider an environment without search
23Ascari and Ropele (2009) show that in the standard New Keynesian model the Taylor principle remains valid
in its more general formulation; however, its implications are radically different as the level of inflation affects the
local stability properties.
24As in Chiu and Molico (2010), we construct a two-dimensional grid on (ξ, χ), use the model to derive the
implied money to output ratio and compute the corresponding mean square errors relative to the ratio of M1 to
GDP for different interest rates for the U.S.. The money demand data is taken from Lucas and Nicolini (2015) for
the period 1915-1984.
25In terms of CM output, the first two correspond to 21.85% and 37.15%.
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frictions σ = 1,26 and arbitrarily fix κ to 0.25.27 We later perform sensitivity analysis with respect
to both σ and κ.
To analyze the consequences for inflation dynamics when changing the aggressiveness of mon-
etary and fiscal rules, we consider a range of values for α and γ. To further discipline the model
and to provide a meaningful comparison, for each pair of α and γ, the policy parameters α0 and γ0
are re-calibrated so that, without secondary markets, they deliver the same steady state values for
real bonds and inflation. We refer to this inflation Π0 as the inflation target. Table 1 summarizes
our calibration and targets.
Table 1: Calibration Targets
Parameter Target
β = 0.9758 Annual real interest rate of 2.5 %
χ and ξ U. S. ratio of M1 to GDP in 1915-1984
G = 0.2185 Government spending of 21.85 % of CM GDP
γ0 Government debt of 37.15 % of CM GDP
α0 Inflation rate of 5.27 %
With this benchmark calibration, we first explore the effects of active and passive monetary
policies on the long-run characteristics of the monetary equilibrium in economies with and without
secondary markets for public debt. We then study the robustness of active monetary policies in
delivering a unique steady state and locally stable equilibria for a wide range of fiscal policies and
changes in the economic environment.
6.1 Active and Passive Policies
In this section, for our benchmark calibration, we analyze the resulting monetary equilibria for a
combination of active and passive monetary policies (MP) and fiscal policies (FP).
Table 2 reports real money balances, real bond holdings, the interest spread (s˜), and the
monetary and fiscal eigenvalues, which are denoted by λM and λF , respectively.
28 We show the
corresponding values for an economy with no SM and with SM for Case 1. In particular, we
consider an active monetary policy, α = 1.50, and a passive one, α = 0.50. For fiscal policy, we
consider an active one, γ = 0.020, and a passive one, γ = 0.025. The results with no SM are
shown for comparison purposes as they present the outcomes that the policy mix would achieve if
there were no secondary markets.
26The fit of our money demand to the U.S. data for different σ is plotted in Figure 6 in the Appendix.
27For this κ, Case 1 monetary equilibria exist for a wide variety of policy parameters.
28We name the monetary eigenvalue as the one that would be commonly the monetary one. Similarly, we denote
the other eigenvalue as the fiscal one.
23
Table 2: Active/Passive MP and FP
No SM SM
Active MP Passive MP Active MP Passive MP
Active FP Passive FP Active FP Passive FP Active FP Passive FP Active FP Passive FP
Π 1.0527 1.0527 1.0527 1.0527 1.0330 1.0444 1.3674 1.3142
b 0.3715 0.3715 0.3715 0.3715 0.2074 0.2014 0.0195 0.0273
s˜ 0 0 0 0 0.0094 0.0039 0.1651 0.1372
λM 1.4638 1.4638 0.4879 0.4879 0.7803 0.7805 0.2702 0.2689
λF 1.0048 0.9997 1.0048 0.9997 1.0695 1.0631 0.8750 0.8974
Policy parameters: MP active: α = 1.50, passive: α = 0.50. FP active: γ = 0.020, passive: γ = 0.025.
As we can see from Table 2, there exists a unique steady state regardless whether agents trade
in SM or not. This is the case across all policies considered. When there is no trade in SM, and
consistent with Lemma 2, an active (passive) monetary policy induces a lower (higher) steady
state inflation relative to an economy with SM trade.
For an active MP and passive FP, our benchmark delivers a steady state inflation equal to
4.44%, which is higher that the annual average inflation observed between 1985 and 2006 (3.06%),
when there was trade in secondary markets for public debt. The resulting equilibrium interest rate
spread is equal to 0.39%, which is less than the one experienced during that period (2.48%).29 In
contrast, when the fiscal policy is active, γ = 0.020, we find that inflation is further reduced and
spreads are higher. In the Appendix, we show that there are combinations of fiscal and monetary
policy responsiveness that can fit well the average inflation rate and interest spread data.
In the literature, passive monetary policy has been widely suggested as a culprit for the inflation
episodes and great volatility before the Great Moderation.30 Consistent with this conventional
wisdom, Table 2 shows that with a passive monetary policy and regardless of the fiscal stance,
steady state inflation is higher when there is trade in SM relative to an economy when there is no
trade. When this passive monetary policy is paired with active fiscal policy, steady state inflation
and spreads are lower than when paired with a passive fiscal policy.
In terms of local stability, Table 2 highlights that an active monetary policy induces stability
in all steady states regardless of the stance of fiscal policy. Against conventional wisdom, an
active monetary policy paired with an active fiscal policy does not necessarily lead to locally
indeterminate equilibria. When agents trade in SM, the liquidity premium reduces the monetary
eigenvalue, λM , while strengthens the fiscal one, λF , enough to deliver determinacy. This is not
the case when agents do not trade in SM, as such policies always deliver indeterminate equilibria.
29The interest rate spread data has been calculated as the difference between the AAA corporate bond yield and
the 1-year treasury constant maturity rate.
30We refer to by Clarida et al. (1999) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), among others, for more on this issue.
Eusepi and Preston (2017), on the other hand, emphasize the role of learning and the maturity of structure in
delivering the inflation experiences during the Great Moderation. More in line with this paper is De Blas (2009)
who emphasizes the role of financial frictions.
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Table 2 also points out that regardless of the fiscal stance, a passive monetary policy dampens
both the fiscal and the monetary eigenvalues. With passive monetary and fiscal policies, the
equilibrium is always indeterminate regardless whether agents trade in SM or not. However, even
when the fiscal policy is active, a passive monetary policy leads to indeterminate equilibria.31 These
results highlight the importance of explicitly modeling the liquidity services that bonds provide.
When the economy has a premium on public debt, the Ricardian equivalence breaks down. This
ultimately alters the fiscal backing of bonds drastically changing inflation expectations relative to
a model without a premium. In the Appendix, we illustrate that our qualitative results are robust
to changes in search frictions in DM (σ) and SM (κ).
Are steady states unique regardless of the particulars of the Taylor rule? Does an active mon-
etary policy always lead to a unique locally determinate equilibria? Does a passive monetary
policy always deliver local instability? Figure 1 illustrates the existence, stability and uniqueness
of monetary equilibria for a range of fiscal and monetary policies when agents trade in SM. These
include both active and passive policies. Following the traditional policy prescriptions and the
nomenclature used in Leeper (1991), Area I in Figure 1 represents the parameter space consistent
with traditionally active monetary and passive fiscal policies. Area II corresponds to a tradition-
ally passive monetary policy paired with a traditionally active fiscal policy. Area III captures
traditionally passive fiscal and monetary policies. Finally, Area IV represents traditionally active
monetary policy paired with traditionally active fiscal policy.32
Figure 1: Uniqueness and Stability of Steady States
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As we can see from Figure 1, the possibility of real indeterminacy is observed when monetary
31This result is in sharp contrast to Canzoneri and Diba (2005), who find that their exogenous liquidity premium
makes the equilibrium determinate when monetary policy is passive. This is the case even when monetary policy
follows an interest rate peg.
32There are policy combinations for which a Case 1 equilibrium does not exist, that implies that at least one of
the short-selling constraint in SM may not bind.
25
and fiscal polices are passive. When there are multiple steady states, one of them is locally
determinate and the other one is unstable. Moreover, under a passive monetary policy, if there
exist a unique steady state, it is indeterminate. This is the case irrespective of the fiscal stance.
On the other hand, real determinacy is observed when the central bank follows an active monetary
policy. The unique steady state can be stable or unstable, depending on the fiscal stance. There
seems to be a threshold level of fiscal policy, γ, above which passive monetary policy leads to
multiple steady states and active monetary policy leads to either non-existence of equilibrium or
uniqueness of equilibrium where agents trade in SM.
These real indeterminacy findings are robust to alternative parameterizations, as shown in
Figure 7, which can be found in the Appendix. Different structural parameters modify the degree
of passiveness of fiscal policy for which multiple steady states may exist. In addition, for some
parameter values, a very high inflation rate may eliminate the unstable equilibria in the region
where there were multiple steady states. In a later part of the paper, we also explore the sensitivity
of these results to alternative inflation targets. Finally, Table 3 illustrates the results obtained in
Proposition 1 under passive monetary policy.
Table 3: Changes in MP Stance and Multiplicity of Equilibria
No SM Case 1
α = 0.00 α = 0.50 α = 2β α = 0.00 α = 0.50 α =
2
β
One SS One SS One SS SS1 SS2 SS1 SS2 One SS
Π 1.0527 1.0527 1.0527 1.0530 1.2271 1.0531 1.2826 1.0366
b 0.3715 0.3715 0.3715 0.1963 0.0319 0.1964 0.0336 0.1941
R˜−R 0 0 0 0.0003 0.1787 0.0002 0.1206 0.0166
λM 0 0.4879 2.0000 0 0 0.2620 0.2680 1.1236
λF 0.9963 0.9963 0.9963 1.0499 0.9092 1.0509 0.9113 1.0068
As we can see from Table 3, both a moderately passive, α = 0.50, or an interest rate peg,
α = 0, induces multiplicity of steady states. However, an adequate active monetary policy, as
those suggested in Proposition 1; i.e, α = (2/β), delivers a unique steady state when agents
trade in SM. Even though, the real indeterminacy has been ruled out, the corresponding unique
monetary equilibrium is locally undetermined.
Unless specific coordinated monetary and fiscal policies are considered, real indeterminacy
under passive monetary policies is a robust phenomena. This can generate another source of
volatility, as sunspot equilibria can be easily constructed. These results are in sharp contrast
to Canzeroni and Diba (2005), who find that passive monetary policy paired with passive fiscal
policy can lead to locally stable monetary steady states. This is the case even when the monetary
policy follows an interest peg, α = 0. Figure 1 shows that this only happens in combination
with the existence of multiple steady states, and therefore, the potential for real indeterminacy.
When unique, our numerical results show that a passive monetary policy leads to an unstable
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equilibrium. These findings are consistent with the multiplicity of steady states generated by a
bond liquidity Laffer curve. One steady state is stable and the other one is unstable. In the stable
steady state, the fiscal eigenvalue is above unity and provides local determinacy.
6.2 Exploring the Mechanism
Given the benchmark calibration, we now explore the mechanism driving the previous real and
local indeterminacy results.
Real Indeterminacies
In this section we examine how the liquidity premium on bond interacts with monetary and fiscal
policies in generating multiple stationary equilibria. Recall that a stationary equilibria when
buyers and sellers are constrained when trading in SM is given by
Π =
1
( 2
β
− α)
(
α0 + 1− σ + θˆ
)
, (31)
b =
(G− γ0) Π
(2− α + γ) Π− (1 + α0) . (32)
We now explore whether there is a bond Laffer curve.33 Using (32), one can solve for Π
b
as
a function of only the inflation rate, Π. Plugging that ratio into θˆ in (31), we get the following
expression in terms of the inflation rate
α0 + (1− σ) + θˆ −
(
2
β
− α
)
Π = 0. (33)
Whenever this expression is equal to zero, we have a steady state solution for Π. Then through
(32), we can then determine the corresponding level for real bonds b. For G − γ0 > 0, the bond
premium, θˆ, increases in Π. Then the slope of (33) may be positive or negative. Differentiating
(33) with respect to inflation, we find that it is given by
(2 + γ − α)
(
ξθˆ b
Π
(G− γ0)
)
−
(
2
β
− α
)
. (34)
The second derivative is clearly negative. Moreover, from (33), it is easy to see that the adequate
monetary and fiscal policies of Proposition 5 eliminate one of the possible stationary equilibria.
33Note that the real bonds implied by the government budget constraint, equation (32), directly depend on the
fiscal stance (γ0 or γ). This is the case as taxes are linked to bonds and the fact that the fiscal backing affects bond
issuance. Moreover, bonds are also affected by the inflation rate as they impact their real return.
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Figure 2 draws the fix point equation (33) for a passive monetary policy paired with two
different passive fiscal policies.
Figure 2: Bond Laffer Curve for Passive MP
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As we can see from Figure 2, as fiscal policy becomes more passive, γ increases, we find two
inflation rates that are consistent with stationary equilibria. Under the benchmark calibration,
we can then conclude that a bond liquidity Laffer curve exists when traditional passive monetary
policies are implemented. Given the same passive fiscal policy, Figure 3 plots the bond Laffer
curve for both passive and active monetary policies.
Figure 3: Bond Laffer Curve for Active/Passive MP
Active MP: α = 1.50, γ = 0.025 Passive MP: α = 0.50, γ = 0.025
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As we can see, with active and passive monetary policy the corresponding stationary equilibria
are located in different sides of the bond Laffer curve. In particular, with an active monetary
policy, the steady state is unique, locally stable and to the left of the peak of the Laffer curve.
In contrast, with passive monetary policies, the unique steady state is locally unstable and to the
right of the peak of the Laffer curve.
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Local Stability Properties
In our benchmark calibration, the value of the lower off diagonal term in the Jacobian tends to be
quite close to zero.34 This corresponds to a situation where changes in inflation do not affect much
seignorage, and therefore, government bonds. Under these circumstances, we can approximate the
eigenvalues by the diagonal elements of the Jacobian, which are given by
λM ≈ ω1βα− ω3 (ω2 − 1) 1
Π
b
Π
, & λF ≈ 1
β
− 1
2
γ − 1
2
1
Π
(ω2 − 1) ,
where ω1 =
1
2−σ( βΠ)( ξ1−ξ)
and ω2 = 1−σ+(1− ξ) θˆ. Since we are considering equilibria with positive
nominal interest rates, if ξ ≤ 1
1+σ
, then ω1 dampens the monetary eigenvalue for both passive and
active monetary policies.35 This situation reflects the fact that when trading in secondary markets,
money and bonds co-move one to one. This co-movement in the nominal government liabilities
reduces the stabilizing effect of monetary policy.
Both fiscal and monetary eigenvalues are affected by the sign of (ω2 − 1), shown in Figure 4.
Note that 1
2
(ω2 − 1) bΠ2 indicates how inflation affects bond issuance.
Figure 4: Sign of (ω2 − 1).
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For an active monetary policy, we have that (ω2 − 1) < 0, while for passive monetary policy we
have that (ω2 − 1) > 0. This change of sign does not drastically affect the monetary eigenvalue,
as the effect of ω1 dominates. However, when the fiscal stance is such that γ is small, it does affect
the fiscal eigenvalue. In such circumstances we have that this eigenvalue can be written as follows
λF ≈ 1
β
− γ + 1
2
[
γ − 1
Π
(ω2 − 1)
]
.
34In our numerical exercises, C is smaller than 0.002 in absolute value. See Figure 9 in the Appendix.
35In our numerical simulations, there are parameter values for which ω2 ≈ 1 and where ξ ≤ 11+σ .
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For active monetary policies, we find that in general (ω2 − 1) < 0, and secondary markets
amplify the fiscal eigenvalue. While for passive monetary policies, γ − 1
Π
(ω2 − 1) is generically
negative and secondary markets dampen the fiscal eigenvalue. Thus according to our numerical
exercises, we can conclude that secondary markets tend to reduce the stabilizing effect of monetary
policy and depending on the stance of monetary policy, they strengthen or weaken the stabilizing
effect of fiscal policy.36
Inspecting the slope of the fix point equation, given by (34), we see that whether the equilibrium
is at the left or at the right of the peak of the Laffer curve depends on the stances of both monetary
and fiscal policies. Consider a passive monetary policy and/or moderately active one so that
(2 + γ − α) and
(
2
β
− α
)
are positive and approximately equal. For these policies, the economy
is at the left (right) of the peak of the Laffer curve whenever
(
ξθˆ b
Π
(G−γ0)
)
> (<)1. By re-arranging
(32), one can easily show that λF > (<)1, which yields determinacy (indeterminacy), implies(
ξθˆ b
Π
(G−γ0)
)
> (<)1.
How does fiscal policy stabilize a sudden increase in inflation? By looking at the inflation
dynamics equation (29), one can see that decreases in the ratio
(
bt
Πt+1
)
increase the term θˆt+1
of the liquidity premium, which helps lower inflation. Differentiating the right hand side of the
bond dynamics equation (30) with respect to Πt we get
1
2
(ω2 − 1) bΠ2 , which is our term C in the
Jacobian. If future inflation is fixed, increases in inflation Πt lower (raise) the issuance of bonds
bt when (ω2 − 1) < (>) 0. In our numerical exercise, we find this at the left (right) of the peak
of the liquidity Laffer curve and when monetary policy is active (passive). Then active monetary
policy is stabilizing as it decreases bond issuance, which decreases the ratio bt
Πt+1
, which increases
the term θˆt+1 in the liquidity premium, which in turn anchors inflation.
37 When passive monetary
policy delivers two steady states, the stable one shares the same pattern of determinacy. The only
difference between a stable active monetary policy and a stable passive monetary policy is in the
premium dynamics. For both the term θˆt+1 increases, but for active monetary policy the premium
decreases while for passive monetary policy it increases.
Summarizing, the endogenous liquidity premium can generate a liquidity Laffer curve, which is
critical for stability and is intimately connected with the source of multiplicity. Fiscal policy can
stabilize inflation through the effects of bond issuance on the liquidity premium. This stabilization
occurs only when the equilibrium is at the left of the peak of the liquidity curve. The stance of
36There are exceptions. When passive monetary policy induces multiplicity, one of the steady states displays
(ω2 − 1) < 0 so that γ− 1Π (ω2 − 1) is positive in one of the associated eigenvalues and negative in the other. When
monetary policy is aggressively active and induces instability, Figure 4 shows steady states such that the monetary
eigenvalue is above unity and (ω2 − 1) < 0, and then γ − 1Π (ω2 − 1) is positive making both roots unstable. In
some cases, (ω2 − 1) may be positive but sufficiently low so that γ − 1Π (ω2 − 1) is still positive.
37This mechanism is similar to the one shown in Yun (2011). In our paper, nominal bonds make the premium
depend also on inflation. This generates the liquidity Laffer curve and make inflation have non-monotonic effects
on bonds. In our case and in contrast to Yun (2011), a stable equilibrium can also be found when monetary policy
is passive.
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monetary policy can help select that equilibrium.
Importance of the Steady State Inflation Target
Here, we explore how sensitive our results are to different inflation targets. Thus, rather than
considering a long run inflation rate of 5.2%, as in the pre Great Moderation era, let us consider
a situation where the inflation target is 16% instead. Our findings are summarized in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Active and Passive FP/MP when Π0 = 1.16
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As we can see, once the inflation target is higher, multiple steady states are possible even
with an active monetary policy, not just with passive ones. These real indeterminacy results are
consistent with our liquidity Laffer curve explanation. More precisely, with a higher inflation
target, the area for possible equilibria with an active monetary policy is larger, allowing for two
steady states. As stated, the off diagonal term in the Jacobian is very close to zero and the change
in stability and multiplicity is connected to the sign of ω2−1 as shown in Figure 8 of the Appendix.
These results are in sharp contrast with those of Leeper (1991) and others, that consider a
flexible price environment where the steady state level of inflation does not affect the multiplicity
nor determinacy of monetary equilibria. As before, and consistent with Proposition 1, we find
that a very aggressive monetary policy can eliminate one of the steady states. Even though the
underlying frictions are different, our results are in line with Ascari and Ropele (2009), among
others. These authors find that in a basic New Keynesian model neither the Taylor principle nor
the generalized Taylor principle is a sufficient condition for local determinacy of equilibrium when
the long run inflation is positive.
In our paper, we have restricted attention to monetary policy rules like our simple Taylor rule
(9), an interest-spread Taylor rule as in Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010) can induce a unique inflation
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rate at steady state but cannot ensure uniqueness of the steady state level of government bonds
in our environment. This happens as, in general, they do not eliminate the bond Laffer curve.
7 Conclusions
Using an environment where public debt is used not only as a store of value but also as an asset that
can help enlarge consumption possibilities in frictional markets, this paper provides new insights
on how active monetary policies can be useful in ruling out real and dynamic indeterminacies.
When agents trade in secondary markets, we can observe a liquidity premium on public debt.
When it exists, government bonds matter for inflation dynamics and the Ricardian equivalence
does not hold anymore. After a sudden increase in inflation, the fiscal authority can change
their bond issuance to affect the liquidity premium and, in turn, stabilize inflation. This liquid-
ity premium makes the total interest payment on governments bonds non-linear, generating a
bond liquidity Laffer curve. This allows for the possibility of real indeterminacies and drastically
changes inflation expectations and the appropriate monetary and fiscal policies that deliver locally
determinate equilibria.
To rule out real indeterminacies, we show that active monetary policy is more likely to deliver a
unique monetary steady states regardless of the fiscal stance. Our analytical and numerical results
also show that trading in secondary markets amplify steady state inflation when monetary policy is
passive. In contrast, it dampens steady state inflation when monetary policy is active. Moreover,
trading in secondary markets change the stability properties of the economy. Traditional policy
prescriptions that rule out local indeterminacy are no longer useful. Finally, we show that active
monetary policies with a low inflation target can rule out real indeterminacies and generate a
locally determinate equilibria.
Improved monetary policy or declining volatility of economic disturbances are unlikely to be
the sole contributors of delivering the inflation experiences of the Great Moderation in the US.
This paper shows the role of trading in secondary markets for public debt, when bonds exhibit
a premia, in amplifying the effects of active monetary policy and the usefulness of having a low
inflation target. Our findings suggest that, with a more developed secondary market for public
debt, ceteris paribus, monetary policy does not need to be as aggressive to achieve lower inflation.
To anchor inflation expectations monetary policy must respond less aggressively to changes in
inflation, over and above adjustments prescribed by the Taylor principle relative to economies
without a liquidity premium for government debt.
Finally, in this paper we have considered government policies that are dictated by pre-determined
rules and have found that these rules have very different implications once individuals trade in
these markets. In future work, we plan to take a normative approach and study how the properties
of optimal fiscal and monetary policies change once secondary markets provide liquidity.
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Appendix
Beginning of sub-period portfolios
An agent in period t enters CM with a portfolio of fiat money (M˜t−1) and nominal government
bonds (B˜t−1). In particular, we have that
φtM˜t−1 =

φt
(
Mt−1 + atDB
o
t
)
, if DM buyer has traded in SM but not in DM in t,
φt
(
Mt−1 + atDB
o
t −DMst
)
, if DM buyer has traded in SM and in DM in t,
φt Mt−1, if DM buyer has not traded in SM nor in DM in t,
φt
(
Mt−1 −DMt
)
, if DM buyer has not traded in SM but has in DM in t,
φt
(
Mt−1 − atDBot
)
, if DM seller has traded in SM but not in DM in t,
φt
(
Mt−1 − atDBot +DMst
)
, if DM seller has traded in SM but not in DM in t,
φt Mt−1, if DM seller has not traded in SM nor in DM in t,
φt
(
Mt−1 +DMt
)
, if DM seller has not traded in SM but has traded in DM in t,
φtB˜t−1 =

φt
(
Bt−1 −DBot
)
, if DM buyer has traded in SM in t,
φt Bt−1, if DM buyer has not traded in SM in t,
φt
(
Bt−1 +DB
o
t
)
, if DM seller has traded in SM in t,
φt Bt−1, if DM seller has not traded in SM in t.
An agent in period t enters DM with a portfolio of fiat money (Mˆt−1) and nominal government
bonds (Bˆt−1). In particular, we have that
φtMˆt−1 =

φt
(
Mt−1 + atDB
o
t
)
, if DM buyer has traded in SM in t,
φt Mt−1, if DM buyer has not traded in SM in in t,
φt
(
Mt−1 − atDBot
)
, if DM seller has traded in SM in t,
φt Mt−1, if DM seller has not traded in SM in t,
φtBˆt−1 =

φt
(
Bt−1 −DBot
)
, if DM buyer has traded in SM in t,
φt Bt−1, if DM buyer has not traded in SM in t,
φt
(
Bt−1 +DB
o
t
)
, if DM seller has traded in SM in t,
φt Bt−1, if DM seller has not traded in SM in t.
Note that DB
o
t denotes the units of government bonds that sellers transfer to buyers in SM, at the
price per unit of bonds in SM, DMst the cash payment in DM for goods when the buyer traded in
the previous SM and DMt the DM payment when the buyer did not trade in SM.
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Derivation of Dynamic Monetary Equilibrium Case 1
When both constraints bind while trading in SM, the dynamic monetary equilibrium can be
characterized by the sequence
{
Πt+1, bt,mt, µ
s
t , µ
b
t
}∞
t=0
satisfying the following equations
Πt+1 = β
(
α0 + αΠt +
1
2
µbt+1
)
,
bt = G− γ0 +
(
1
β
− γ − 1
2
µbt
Πt
)
bt−1 +
mt−1
Πt
−mt,
σ
[
κ
(
χ
Πξt+1
(2mt)
ξ
− 1
)
+ (1− κ)
(
χ
Πξt+1
mtξ
− 1
)]
+ µst+1 = 2 (α0 + αΠt − 1) + µbt+1,
σ
(
χ
Πξt
(2mt−1)ξ
− 1
)
− µst − µbt = 0,
and bt = mt, since D
Bo
t+1 = mt and D
Bo
t+1 = bt. Solving for the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers, we get
µbt+1 = σ
(
χ
Πξt+1
(2bt)
ξ
− 1
)
+ (1− κ)1
2
σχ
Πξt+1
bt
ξ
(
1− 1
(2)ξ
)
− (α0 + αΠt − 1) ,
µst+1 = −(1− κ)
1
2
σχ
Πξt+1
bt
ξ
(
1− 1
(2)ξ
)
+ (α0 + αΠt − 1) .
Substituting back these expressions we arrive to the dynamic equations found in the text.
Proof of Lemma 1
Imposing s˜ = 0 and steady state conditions on equations (5)-(6), the steady state inflation and debt are
Π0 =
βα0
(1−αβ) and b0 =
G−γ0
1−
(
1
β
−γ
) , respectively. Imposing s˜ = 0 on the dynamic system, the Jacobian is
J =
[
βα 0
0 1β − γ
]
.
Therefore traditional active/passive monetary policies deliver locally determinate equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 1
Imposing steady state conditions on equations (5)-(6), the equilibrium inflation rate and real debt solves
the following fixed point:
Π = β [α0 + αΠ + s˜(Π, b)] ,
b = G− γ0 +
(
1
β
− γ − s˜(Π, b)
Π
)
b.
37
When s˜(Π, b) is a nonlinear function in both arguments, then the above system of non-linear
equations may have more than one solution. From the first equation, it is also easy to see that
traditionally active (passive) monetary policies deliver inflation that is lower (higher) than Π0.
In terms of policies that deliver local determinacy, it is important to highlight that the bond
premia drastically changes the properties of the associated Jacobian. In particular, we have that
J =
 1(1−β ∂s˜t+1∂Πt+1 )
(
βα+ β ∂s˜t+1∂bt
(
s˜t −Π ∂s˜t∂Πt
)
b
Π2
) β ∂s˜t+1
∂bt(
1−β ∂s˜t+1
∂Πt+1
) ( 1
β − γ − s˜Π − bΠ ∂s˜t∂bt−1
)
(
s˜t −Π ∂s˜t∂Πt
) (
b
Π2
)
1
β − γ − s˜Π − bΠ ∂s˜t∂bt−1
 .
Thus the resulting policy prescriptions for stability are likely to be different from those obtained
without a premium or with a premium that does not depend on fundamentals.
Proof of Proposition 2 and 3
After imposing stationarity, we have that the unique monetary steady state is given by
Π =
βα0
(1− βα) , b =
1(
1− 1β + γ
) {(G− γ0) + ( 1
Π
− 1
)
m
}
,
where steady state real balances are m = Π
[
χσ
2(α0+αΠ−1)+σ
] 1
ξ
. The corresponding Jacobian is
J =
[
βα 0
ω0
1
β
− γ
]
,
where ω0 =
∂bt
∂Πt
6= 0. Given that the dynamic system is decoupled, the corresponding eigenvalues
are λM = βα & λF =
1
β
− γ. For the results in Proposition 2 we just need to set σ = 0, which
implies that mt=0 ∀t.
Proof of Lemma 2
The Kuhn-Tucker multipliers in steady state are given by
µb = 2
[(
1
β
− α
)
Π− α0
]
,
µs = −1
2
σχ
Πξ
bξ
(1− κ)
[
1− 1
(2)ξ
]
+ (α0 + αΠ− 1) .
When there is no trade in secondary markets, the steady state inflation equals α0β
1−βα , which is Π0.
For µb to be positive it requires that if α0 ≥ 0 and αβ < 1, then Π ≥ Π0, or if α0 ≤ 0 and αβ > 1,
then Π ≤ Π0. These two inequalities are consistent with the statement in the Lemma.
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Proof of Proposition 4
After imposing steady state conditions, we have that the monetary steady state {Π, b,m} satisfy
b = m and the following non-linear equations
Π =
1
( 2β − α)
(
α0 + 1− σ + σχ1
2
Πξ
bξ
[
1 + κ
(2)ξ
+ (1− κ)
])
,
b =
(G− γ0) Π
(2− α+ γ) Π− (1 + α0) .
Once we substitute the steady state bond equation into the equation that defines the steady state
inflation rate, we obtain the following
(
2
β
− α
)
Π− (α0 + 1− σ) = σχ1
2
 Π
2(G−γ0)Π
(2−α+γ)Π−(1+α0)
ξ [1 + κ
(2)ξ
+ (1− κ)
]
,
As can be seen, the resulting equation characterizing the steady state inflation is highly non-linear.
Thus multiple steady states can not be ruled out.
Proof of Proposition 5
Let us consider an economy where G > γ0, α0 < 0 and 2 + γ > α. When α =
2
β
, it is easy to show
that the steady state inflation is unique and given by
Π =
2 (G− γ0)(
2− 2β + γ
)
 2 (σ − α0 − 1)
σχ
[
1+κ
(2)ξ
+ (1− κ)
]
 1ξ + (1 + α0)(
2− 2β + γ
) .
Let us consider an economy where G > γ0, α0 < 0 and αβ > 1. When α = 2 + γ, it is easy to
show that the steady state inflation is unique and given by
Π =
1
2
β − α
[
(α0 + 1− σ) + σχ1
2
( −α0 − 1
2 (G− γ0)
)ξ (1 + κ
(2)ξ
+ (1− κ)
)]
.
Proof of Lemma 3 and 4
Given our derivation of the dynamic monetary equilibrium in Case 1, the Jacobian is given by:
J =
[
A B
C D
]
=
 ω1βα− ω3 (ω2 − 1) 1Π bΠ −ω3 [ 1β − 12γ − 12 1Π (ω2 − 1)]
1
2 (ω2 − 1) 1Π bΠ 1β − 12γ − 12 1Π (ω2 − 1)
 ,
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with ω1 =
1
2
(
1−β
1
2 ξθˆ
Π
) , ω2 = 1−σ+(1− ξ) θˆ, and ω3 = ω1 βξθˆb , where θˆ = 12σχ Πξ(2b)ξ
(
1 + κ+ (1− κ)(2)ξ
)
,
which can be written as θˆ =
(
2
β
− α
)
Π− α0 − 1 + σ.
In contrast to the traditional case, the values outside of the main diagonal in the Jacobian may
not be zero and, even if they were, the elements in the diagonal are different to the traditional
ones. Then, traditional active/passive policies are not useful in delivering locally determinate
equilibria.
Lemma 4 follows directly from the steady state inflation and bonds found in the proof of
Proposition 4 and the Jacobian found in Lemma 3.
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Additional Tables, Figures and Robustness Analysis
Table 4: Active/Passive MP and FP for Different Policy Parameters
No SM SM
MP Active1 MP Active2 MP Passive1 MP Passive2 MP Active1 MP Active2 MP Passive1 MP Passive2
One SS One SS One SS One SS One SS One SS SS1 SS2 SS1 SS2
Π 1.0527 1.0527 1.0527 1.0527 1.0301 1.0309 1.0894 1.1071 1.08201 1.1572
b 0.3715 0.3715 0.3715 0.3715 0.1993 0.2085 0.1282 0.1052 0.1525 0.0826
s˜ 0 0 0 0 0.0181 0.0104 0.0376 0.0557 0.0154 0.0548
λM 1.7809 1.4638 0 0.4879 0.9358 0.7802 0 0 0.2628 0.2648
λF 0.9998 1.0058 0.9768 0.9797 1.0807 1.0707 1.0073 0.8974 1.0221 0.9730
Policy Parameters: MP Active1: α = 1.85,γ = 0.025. MP Active2: α = 1.5, γ = 0.019. MP Passive1: α = 0, γ = 0.048. MP Passive2:
α = 0.5, γ = 0.048.
Table 5: Active/Passive MP and FP with σ = 0.75
No SM SM
Active MP Passive MP Active MP Passive MP
Active FP Passive FP Active FP Passive FP Active FP Passive FP Active FP Passive FP
Π 1.0527 1.0527 1.0527 1.0527 1.0344 1.0461 1.4153 1.3517
b 0.3633 0.3633 0.3633 0.3633 0.2007 0.1949 0.0175 0.0245
s˜ 0 0 0 0 0.0087 0.0032 0.1903 0.1569
λM 1.4638 1.4638 0.4879 0.4879 0.7809 0.7812 0.2748 0.2726
λF 1.0048 0.9997 1.0048 0.9997 1.0709 1.0647 0.8635 0.8884
Policy parameters: MP active: α = 1.50, passive: α = 0.50. FP active: γ = 0.020, passive: γ = 0.025.
Table 6: Active/Passive MP and FP with κ = 0.10
No SM SM
Active MP Passive MP Active MP Passive MP
Active FP Passive FP Active FP Passive FP Active FP Passive FP Active FP Passive FP
Π 1.0527 1.0527 1.0527 1.0527 1.0281 1.0376 1.3807 1.3279
b 0.3715 0.3715 0.3715 0.3715 0.2213 0.2160 0.0190 0.0264
s˜ 0 0 0 0 0.0116 0.0079 0.1721 0.1443
λM 1.4638 1.4638 0.4879 0.4879 0.7801 0.7803 0.2706 0.2692
λF 1.0048 0.9997 1.0048 0.9997 1.0712 1.0655 0.8690 0.8908
Policy parameters: MP active: α = 1.50, passive: α = 0.50. FP active: γ = 0.020, passive: γ = 0.025.
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Figure 6: Model vs U.S. Data for Different σ
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Figure 7: Steady State Uniqueness and Stability in Region 1: Robustness Analysis
Figure 7a: Benchmark Figure 7b: Π0 = 1.16 Figure 7c: Π0 = 1.25
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Figure 7g: κ = 1.00 Figure 7h: B = 0.44 Figure 7i: G = 0.27
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Figure 7j: β = 0.98 Figure 7k: 1960− 1984 Figure 7l: 1915− 2008
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Figure 8: Sign of ω2 − 1 in Region 1: Robustness Analysis
Figure 8a: Benchmark Figure 8b: Π0 = 1.16 Figure 8c: Π0 = 1.25
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Figure 9: Size of C in Region 1: Robustness Analysis
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